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Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc.:
Dealing with Vicarious Liability for
Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor
By DANIEL N. RAYrIs*
IMAGINE A COMPANY that has been at the forefront of a movement
in its community to eliminate all types of harassment in the work-
place.' The company instituted a harassment avoidance program
nearly five years ago, which was applicable to the company's entire
work force. As part of the program, the company holds regular train-
ing sessions with all employees to educate veteran employees about
changes within the program and to inform new employees of its exis-
tence and procedures. "If you feel that you've been harassed," the
company tells its employees, "there is a confidential grievance proce-
dure, and your complaint will be investigated immediately." The em-
ployees are also assured that the company will not tolerate any
retaliation by an accused employee. Recent statistics show that the
program has virtually eliminated harassment in the workplace.
Assume further that despite these preventative efforts, a wayward
supervisor sexually harasses a female employee. The employee
promptly reports it through the company's confidential procedure.
An investigation is immediately commenced, which results in the dis-
charge of the harassing supervisor. Despite the prompt action by the
company, however, the harassed employee continues to feel uncom-
fortable at work, and files suit against the company alleging sexual
harassment under Title VII. 2 How will the courts deal with this or a
similar situation?
* Class of 2001. I would like to recognize the loving and intellectual support of my
wife, Katy Raytis, Boalt Hall, Class of 2001.
1. This hypothetical is fictional and is not based on actual events.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994). Title VII states: "(a) It shall be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer-(]) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
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The United States Supreme Court recently imposed vicarious lia-
bility on employers for sexual harassment committed by a supervisor
in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth3 and Faragher v. City of Boca Ra-
ton.4 Additionally, the Court created an affirmative defense for em-
ployers that requires an employer to prove "two necessary elements:
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and cor-
rect promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plain-
tiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise." 5 Under Ellerth/Faragher, the employer in the above
hypothetical would be liable, regardless of the preventative and reme-
dial measures it had taken.6 This is because an employee who has ac-
ted reasonably in reporting harassing conduct eliminates the
possibility of the employer proving the second element of the affirma-
tive defense, which makes the first element of the affirmative de-
fense-an employer's conduct to prevent or remedy a harassing
situation-irrelevant. 7 Despite this United States Supreme Court man-
date, a recent opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Indest v.
Freeman Decorating, Inc.,8 demonstrates the reluctance of lower courts
to impose liability on an employer that has taken steps to remedy or
prevent harassment that does occur, even though an employee acts
reasonably in reporting the conduct.9
Part I of this Note examines Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,10
the seminal United States Supreme Court decision addressing an em-
ployer's liability for sexual harassment by a supervisor." Part I also
discusses the development of the hostile work environment theory of
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's.., sex ......
Id.
3. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
4. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). These opinions adopted the same holding and were both
issued on June 26, 1998. Therefore, this Note commonly refers to the cases and their hold-
ings collectively as Ellerth/Faragher.
5. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
6. See id. at 773 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that despite an employer's prompt
response, an employee acting reasonably by immediately reporting offensive conduct,
thereby eliminates the employer's affirmative defense under E'lerth/Faragher); see also dis-
cussion infra Part IV.
7. See id. at 773 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8. 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).
9. See id. at 267 (noting that the prompt remedial response by the employer removes
liability for sexual harassment).
10. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
11. See id. at 63-69.
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sexual harassment recognized by the Supreme Court in Meitor.12 Part
II explains the Supreme Court's new standard of liability and the rea-
soning it provided for creating the affirmative defense enunciated in
Ellerth/Faragher. Part III, the focus of this Note, analyzes two separate
opinions issued by a panel of the Fifth Circuit in Indest. Part IV consid-
ers Indest's assessment of Ellerth and Faragher and attempts a proper
analysis of the facts of Indest under the Ellerth/Faragher decisions. It
also analyzes the elements and effect of the affirmative defense on
employer liability. Part V proposes an alternative defense that focuses
primarily on the employer's actions and allows an employer to escape
liability with proof of its reasonable behavior both before and after a
harassing situation arises. This Note concludes that such an approach
would alleviate the apparent concerns of the Indest court and would
better serve the United States Supreme Court's reasoning for creating
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.
I. Background: Developments in Title VII Sexual Harassment
A. Meitor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson-Recognizing the Hostile
Work Environment As Actionable Sexual Harassment
The United States Supreme Court first recognized that sexual
harassment was actionable under a hostile work environment theory
in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.13 The plaintiff, Michelle Vinson,
alleged that she had been subjected to sexual harassment by the vice
president of the defendant bank.' 4 She had been employed at the
bank for four years, had been promoted from teller to head teller,
and eventually became assistant branch manager.1 5 She specifically al-
leged that the vice president, Sidney Taylor, forced her to have sexual
relations with him through repeated demands, which she felt she
could not refuse. ' 6 After being discharged from the bank for excessive
12. This Note does not examine sexual harassment that results in a tangible employ-
ment decision, such as hiring, firing, or demotion. In this area, courts have long held that
the employer is strictly liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor. See id. at 76 (Marshall,
J., concurring) (citing appellate court decisions which have held that sexual harassment by
a supervisor is automatically imputed to the employer when the harassment results in tan-
gible job detriment to the harassed employee).
13. 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). The Court explained that "a plaintiff may establish a viola-
tion of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abu-
sive work environment." Id.
14. See id. at 60.
15. See id. at 59-60.
16. See id. at 60. Vinson alleged that she had sexual relations with Taylor forty to fifty
times, including occasions where he had forcibly raped her. See id.
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use of sick leave, Vinson filed suit against the bank and Taylor claim-
ing sexual harassment in violation of Title VII.17 The district court
denied relief, citing the voluntary nature of the relationship and the
fact that it did not have an adverse effect on Vinson's advancement at
the bank.' 8 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the trial court's decision and recognized a hostile work envi-
ronment theory of recovery.' 9
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the court of ap-
peals that unwelcome sexual advances that create an offensive or hos-
tile working environment violate Title VII.20 In addition, the opinion
rejected the defendant's argument that tangible, economic loss was
required to find harassment actionable under Title VII. 2 1 The Court
reasoned that "the language of Title VII is not limited to 'economic'
or 'tangible' discrimination. '"2 2 The Court accepted Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines which prohib-
ited "'[u] nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."' 2 3
In an attempt to provide some guidance for hostile work environ-
ment cases, the Supreme Court noted that "not all workplace conduct
that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or
privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII."2 4 The
opinion further instructed that "[f] or sexual harassment to be action-
able, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions
of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment."25 However, the Court did not present any factors, or provide
further guidance, on how to determine whether certain conduct rises
to the level of a hostile work environment.
B. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.-Refining the Hostile Work
Environment
In an attempt to clarify the level of conduct actionable as a hostile
work environment claim, the United States Supreme Court revisited
17. See id.
18. See Vinson v. Taylor, 23 F.E.P. Cases 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980).
19. SeeVinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (relying on Bundy v.Jack-
son, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
20. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
24. Id. at 67.
25. Id. (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
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the issue in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.26 In Harris, the company presi-
dent, Charles Hardy, frequently made sexually degrading comments
and sexual innuendos to the plaintiff, Teresa Harris.2 7 After two years,
Harris quit and sued Forklift claiming that Hardy's conduct created
an abusive work environment for her because of her gender. 28 The
district court held that Hardy's conduct did not create an abusive en-
vironment, focusing primarily on whether the conduct seriously af-
fected the plaintiffs psychological well-being.2 9 The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. 30 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari 3 in light of the conflict among circuit
courts over whether serious psychological harm or injury is required
for conduct to be actionable under a hostile work environment
theory. 32
In Harris, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court's decision and remanded, holding that the conduct need not
seriously affect an employee's psychological well-being or lead the em-
ployee to suffer injury. 33 The Court reaffirmed Meritor's "severe and
pervasive" standard, noting that it "takes a middle path between mak-
ing actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the
conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury."3 4 The Harris Court
further clarified the Meritor standard, stating:
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objec-
tively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title
VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive
the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered
the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title
VII violation.35
The opinion instructed that in making this determination, a
court must look at all of the circumstances, which "may include the
26. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
27. See id. at 19.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 20.
30. See id.; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (1992) (judgment order).
31. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 507 U.S. 959 (1993) (granting certiorari).
32. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 20 (comparing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d
611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring serious effect on psychological well-being), Vance v. S.
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989) (same), and Downes v. FAA, 775
F.2d 288, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1985), with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting a requirement of serious effect on psychological well-being)).
33. See id. at 22.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Id. at 21-22.
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frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance." 36
C. Setting the Standard for Employer Liability
Before Ellerth/Faragher, Meritor was the only case from the United
States Supreme Court addressing the standard for employer liability
in cases of sexual harassment by a supervisor. Although the Meyitor
Court "decline[d] the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on
employer liability," it held that "the Court of Appeals erred in con-
cluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual har-
assment by their supervisors." 37 The court.of appeals had imposed
strict liability regardless of whether the employer knew or should have
known about the harassing conduct. 38 The Supreme Court found that
other factual issues needed to be resolved before making a determina-
tion of liability, 39 but further explained that "Congress wanted courts
to look to agency principles for guidance in this area."40
The Court considered imposing either a strict liability or negli-
gence standard on employers for sexual harassment by a supervisor. 41
The plaintiff-employee argued Title VII's definition of "employer" in-
cludes agents, 42 and therefore urged strict liability under the theory
that "the supervisor is the employer and the employer is the supervi-
sor."'4 3 The defendant-employer countered that notice should be re-
quired.44 Lack of notice would absolve the employer of liability
because the plaintiff had failed to use the employer's established
grievance procedure, thereby denying the employer an opportunity to
respond. 45
36. Id. at 23.
37. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
38. See id. at 63 (citing Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
39. See id. at 72.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 70-72.
42. An "agent" is generally defined as "[a] person authorized by another (principal)
to act for or in the place of him; one entrusted with another's business." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 63 (6th ed. 1990).
43. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70 (quoting Brief of Respondent Michelle Vinson at 27, Mer-
itor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979)).
44. See id.
45. See id.
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The Court also entertained arguments from the EEOC as amicus
curiae.46 The EEOC distinguished between cases in which the supervi-
sor uses actual authority delegated by the employer, such as threats to
affect the employment status of an employee, and those that involve a
"hostile working environment,".7 where no tangible job action is
taken.48 In the former cases, the EEOC advocated imputing those ac-
tions "to the employer whose delegation of authority empowered the
supervisor to undertake [those actions] ." 4 9 In the latter cases, the
EEOC suggested that the "usual basis for a finding of agency will often
disappear."50 The EEOC determined that, in the "hostile environ-
ment" cases, a proper rule looks to the efforts of the employer to pre-
vent and correct harassment, and the steps the employee took to
notify the employer of such harassment.51
Although the Court discussed the parties' arguments, the opinion
did not come to a definitive conclusion regarding liability.5 2 The Jus-
tices did "not know at this stage whether [the supervisor] made any
sexual advances toward[s] [the employee] at all, let alone whether
those advances were [actionable]. ' 5 3 The Court simply found that
Congress intended some limit on employer liability for the acts of its
employees and instructed lower "courts [to] look to agency principles
for guidance in this area. '54
46. See id. at 70-71.
47. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 35 (describing Meritors definition of
hostile work environment).
48. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71. A tangible employment action is defined as "a signif-
icant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
49. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70 (quoting Brief for the United States and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae at 22, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979)).
50. Id. at 71 (quoting Brief for the United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae at 26,
Meritor (No. 84-1979)).
51. See id. The EEOC noted that "[i]f the employer has an expressed policy against
sexual harassment and has implemented a procedure specifically designed to resolve sex-
ual harassment claims, and if the victim does not take advantage of that procedure, the
employer should be shielded from liability absent actual knowledge of the sexually hostile
environment." Id.
52. See id. at 72.
53. Id. The Court relied upon the district court's opinion for a summary of the rele-
vant facts because it was not provided with a complete trial transcript. See id. at 60 n.t.
54. Id. at 72. "Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of the
employer . . . surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for
which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible." Id.
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However,' Meritor provided some guidance in that it expressly re-
jected the employer's view that the mere existence of a discrimination
policy and grievance procedure, combined with the plaintiffs failure
to use this policy, was enough to shield the employer from liability. 55
The Court noted specifically that the defendant-employer's policy was
inadequate in two areas: it did not mention sexual harassment, and
the only avenue of redress available to the employee was to report the
harassment to his or her immediate supervisor, in this case the alleged
harasser. 56 However, it ultimately concluded that "the Court of Ap-
peals was wrong to entirely disregard agency principles and impose
absolute liability on employers for the acts of their supervisors, regard-
less of the circumstances of a particular case." 57
Four Justices concurred in the judgment of the Court,58 but as-
serted that the majority should have decided the issue of employer
liability.59 The concurring Justices determined that strict liability was
the appropriate rule governing employer liability for harassment by a
supervisor, regardless of the employer's knowledge. 60 The concur-
rence reasoned, "[i]n both [tangible job detriment and hostile work
environment] cases[,] it is the authority vested in the supervisor by
the employer that enables him to commit the wrong. '6 1
The concurring opinion rejected an argument presented by the
Solicitor General6 2 that advocated for a notice requirement for em-
ployers-i.e., that the employers have some sort of actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the harassing conduct before being held liable-in
cases that involve a discriminatory work environment, as opposed to
those which affect tangible job benefits. 63 The concurring Justices
noted, however, that agency principles and the goals of Title VII re-
quire some limit on employer liability for acts of supervisors. 64 Never-
theless, the concurring Justices concluded that "[t]here is . . . no
justification for a special rule, to be applied only in 'hostile environ-
ment' cases, that sexual harassment does not create employer liability
55. See id.
56. See id. at 72-73.
57. Id. at 73.
58. See id. at 74 (Marshall,J., concurring). Justice Marshall was joined byJustice Bren-
nan, Justice Blackmnun, and Justice Stevens. See id.
59. See id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
60. See id. at 78 (Marshall, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 76-77 (Marshall, J., concurring).
62. The Solicitor General filed a brief as amicus curiae on behalf of the United States
and the EEOC. See id. at 76 (Marshall, J., concurring).
63. See id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
64. See id. at 77 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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until the employee suffering the discrimination, notifies other
supervisors. 65
II. EllerthiFaragher: A New Standard of Employer Liability
A. The Facts and Procedural History
1. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
In Ellerth, the plaintiff, Kimberly Ellerth, worked as a salesperson
for Burlington Industries, Inc. ("Burlington") for approximately four-
teen months.66 She alleged that Ted Slowik, a manager in her depart-
ment, continually subjected her to sexual harassment. 67 Slowik was
not Ellerth's immediate supervisor. 68 However, Ellerth reported to an
individual in the company who reported to Slowik, and therefore
Slowik had "successively higher" authority over Ellerth. 69 Ellerth's alle-
gations focused on three incidents of verbal sexual harassment by
Slowik.70 Soon after the third incident, Ellerth quit, without stating
that her departure was due to Slowik's sexual advances. 7'
Ellerth filed suit in district court, alleging sexual harassment and
constructive discharge in violation of Tide VII.72 The district court
found that Slowik's behavior was actionable, but granted summary
judgment in favor of Burlington, because the company neither knew
nor should have known of the offending conduct. 73 Although the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed en banc, the decision
contained eight opinions, which primarily focused on whether vicari-
ous liability was the proper standard for quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment, as opposed to hostile environment cases. 74
65. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
66. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747 (1998).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 748. In the first incident, Slowik made comments about Ellerth's breasts
and stated that "I could make your life very hard or very easy at Burlington." Id. The sec-
ond incident, which occurred almost a year after the first, involved Slowik stating that he
had reservations about Ellerth's prospects for promotion because she was not "loose
enough." Id. In the third incident, Slowik commented that he would not discuss business
with Ellerth unless she discussed what she was wearing and, furthermore, that wearing
shorter skirts would make her life at work easier. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 749.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 749-51 (discussing Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490
(7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)). Cases in which a supervisor threatens to take a tangible
employment action in exchange for sexual relations are referred to as quid pro quo. See id.
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2. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
For approximately five years, Beth Faragher worked as a lifeguard
for the City of Boca Raton, Florida ("City").75 One year after Faragher
began working as a lifeguard, the City instituted a sexual harassment
policy, of which neither Faragher nor any of the other lifeguards were
informed. 76 Faragher filed suit against the City two years after re-
signing from the lifeguard position, alleging that two of her three su-
pervisors continuously harassed her and other female employees.7 7
Faragher had discussed the harassing behavior with her non-harassing
supervisor, but she failed to report it further or take any other ac-
tion. 78 Before Faragher resigned, another employee complained of
sexual harassment, and the City responded by reprimanding the su-
pervisors and requiring them to choose between a suspension without
pay or the forfeiture of annual leave.79
The district court found the City liable on three grounds: (1) the
harassment was pervasive enough to put the City on notice; (2) the
supervisors were acting as agents of the City when they committed the
harassment; and (3) even the third supervisor Faragher reported the
incidents to failed to take action.80 A panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment on
Faragher's Title VII sexual harassment claim against the City, rejecting
all of the district court's reasons for imputing liability to the City.8 '
The court of appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the panel's conclu-
sion.82 The court held that an employer could be vicariously liable for
a hostile work environment if the harassment occurs within the scope
of employment, or if there was an agency relationship which aids the
supervisor in committing the harassment.8 3
at 751. Prior to Ellerth/Faragher, lower courts had imposed vicarious liability on employers
in cases of quid pro quo harassment. See id. at 753 (citations omitted). Reversing this trend,
the Supreme Court in Ellerth held that quid pro quo harassment, where the threats are not
carried out, should be categorized as hostile environment cases, requiring a showing of
severe or pervasive conduct. See id. at 753-54.
75. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
76. See id. at 781-82.
77. See id. at 780.
78. See id. at 782.
79. See id. at 783.
80. See id.
81. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155, 1168 (11th Cir. 1996).
82. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir. 1997) (en
banc).
83. See id. at 1535. The court of appeals additionally held that an employer could be
vicariously liable for a hostile environment if the employer assigns performance of non-
delegable duties to a supervisor and an employee is harmed as a result thereof. See id. This
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B. The Supreme Court's Holding
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of employer liability for
sexual harassment by a supervisor due to the confusion created by the
absence of a controlling standard. 84 Contrary to Meritor's implicit in-
structions prohibiting strict liability from being imposed on an em-
ployer for the harassing conduct of a supervisor, the Court held that
"[a] n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee
for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with im-
mediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. '85 How-
ever, the Court circumvented stare decisis principles by providing an
affirmative defense for employers to be applied in cases where no
"tangible employment action" is taken against an employee.8 6
The affirmative defense consists of two elements. The employer
must prove: "(a) that [it] exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any pre-
ventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise. '8 7 The Court provided little guidance regard-
ing the use of the affirmative defense. It stated that the existence of an
anti-harassment policy was not necessary as a matter of law, but the
need for such a policy is taken into consideration when litigating the
first element.88
The Court explained that proving the second element is not "lim-
ited to showing any unreasonable failure to use any complaint proce-
dure provided by the employer, [but] a demonstration of such failure
will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden."89 Nevertheless,
Note does not address this holding because the Supreme Court imposed vicarious liability
by analyzing solely those holdings referred to in the text.
84. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998). The Supreme
Court noted that the court of appeals decision produced eight separate opinions and no
consensus for a controlling rationale. See id. at 749; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998) (noting the same).
85. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
86. See id. The Court left previous law unchanged, imposing vicarious liability on em-
ployers for sexual harassment that results in a tangible employment action. See id. at
760-63.
87. Id. at 765.
88. See id. The Court provided implicit guidance by holding, in Faragher, that the City
did not exercise reasonable care as a matter of law. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. The facts
relevant to this determination were: (1) the City did not distribute the policy to beach
employees; (2) the City's officials did not keep track of beach supervisors; and (3) the
City's sexual harassment policy did not include any assurance that the harassing supervi-
sors could be bypassed in registering complaints. See id.
89. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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an employer can prove the elements of the affirmative defense only if
the employer acts reasonably by instituting a harassment grievance
policy and procedure and responds promptly to harassing conduct,
and the employee fails to act reasonably by not reporting the harass-
ing conduct to the employer in a timely manner or avoiding harm
otherwise. "'
C. The Supreme Court's Reasoning
1. Agency Principles
The Supreme Court, in both Ellerth and Faragher, focused prima-
rily on the Restatement of Agency9' for guidance in determining the
standard for employer liability.92 The Court relied on agency princi-
ples, as expressly mandated by Congress and Menitor.93
a. Scope of Employment Analysis
The Court, in Ellerth, began its analysis by discussing whether sex-
ual harassment is within the scope of employment. 94 The majority re-
ferred to section 219(1) of the Restatement, which states that "[a]
master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment."95 The Court noted
that both intentional and negligent conduct could be imputed to the
employer under this section.9 6 However, this broad rule generally re-
quires that the employee's purpose in committing the act be to serve
the employer.97 In regard to sexual harassment, Ellerth reasoned that
the "harassing supervisor often acts for personal motives, motives un-
related and even antithetical to the objectives of the employer."98
Therefore, the Court concluded that sexual harassment is not con-
duct within the scope of employment. 99
The Faragher opinion approached this problem differently, not-
ing that cases outside Title VII define the scope of employment
broadly enough to include intentional torts that in no way serve a pur-
90. See id.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
92. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797-803; see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754-63.
93. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754-55.
94. See id. at 755-56.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(l) (1958).
96. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756.
97. See id.
98. d. at 757.
99. See id.
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pose of the employer. ' 00 Nevertheless, several courts dealing with Title
VII have found sexual harassment to be outside the scope of employ-
ment.' 0 1 The Court explained this tension as resulting from "differing
judgments about the desirability of holding an employer liable for his
subordinates' wayward behavior."' 0 2 The Court inquired "into the rea-
sons that would support a conclusion that the harassing behavior
ought to be within the scope of a supervisor's employment, and the
reasons for the opposite view." 
103
The Faragher opinion found that the only way sexual harassment
may be considered within the scope of employment was to include it
as a cost of doing business. 10 4 The rationale for placing the costs on
the employer "would be the fairness of requiring the employer to bear
the burden of foreseeable social behavior, and the same rationale
would apply when the behavior was that of co-employees."'10 5 How-
ever, in rejecting this view, the Court reasoned that sexual harassment
is generally not committed to serve any interest of the employer, thus
placing it beyond the scope of employment under traditional agency
law.11°6 In support of its analysis, the Court noted the unanimity
among lower courts in applying a negligence standard to analyze an
employer's liability for co-worker harassment.107
b. Aided in the Agency Principle
The Ellerth/Faragher opinions continued with an analysis of sec-
tion 219(2)(d) of the Restatement of Agency,'08 which states, "[a]
master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment, unless ... the servant ... was
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation."109 It is
within the "aided in the agency" principle that the Court found the
authority to impose vicarious liability on employers.
100. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 794 (1998).
101. See id. at 793-94 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 796.
103. Id. at 797.
104. See id. at 798.
105. Id. at 800.
106. See id. at 798.
107. See id. at 799-800. "If, indeed the cases did not rest, at least implicitly, on the
notion that such harassment falls outside the scope of employment, their liability issues
would have turned simply on the application of the scope-of-employment rule." Id. at 800.
108. RESTArEMENT (SEcoND) OF ACENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958). See Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801.
109. RESTArEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (emphasis added).
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The Ellerth Court acknowledged that almost all workplace harass-
ment is accomplished by the existence of an agency relationship.' 10
Strict use of section 219(d) (2) would thus create automatic liability
for employers based on all workplace harassment. "' Meritor, however,
had concluded that employer liability should not be automatic. 1 2
Therefore, the Ellerth Court stated, "[t] he aided in the agency relation
standard ... requires the existence of something more than the em-
ployment relation itself."' 3
Both Ellerth and Faragher analyzed the nature of the supervisor's
position to establish the additional element justifying the imposition
of vicarious liability on the employer for the acts of a supervisor." 14
The Court, in Faragher, argued that "employers have a greater oppor-
tunity and incentive to screen [supervisors], train them, and monitor
their performance" than with the common worker.115 In Ellerth, the
Court noted that there are more factors than the employment rela-
tionship that aid supervisors to commit harassment. 16 Nevertheless, it
is the company that empowers the supervisor to make decisions re-
garding a subordinate's employment and to take tangible employ-
ment action.1 7 Therefore, both opinions imposed vicarious liability
on the employer for harassment resulting in a tangible employment
action. "18
2. Squaring Vicarious Liability with Meritor: The Affrmative
Defense
Because the Court imposed vicarious liability on employers for
supervisor harassment involving a tangible employment action, it was
required to square this decision with Meritor's mandate that employer
liability for sexual harassment not be automatic. 19 Therefore, in an
110. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
111. See id.
112. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
113. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
114. See id. at 760-63; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803.
115. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803.
116. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-61.
117. See id. The Court noted that "only the supervisor, or other person acting with the
authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury." Id. at 762. See also Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 803. The Court explained that "an employee generally cannot check a supervisor's abu-
sive conduct the same way that she might deal with abuse from a co-worker." Faragher, 524
U.S. at 803.
118. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
119. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763. "We are bound by our holding in Meitor that agency
principles constrain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory harassment."
Id.; see also Earagher, 524 U.S. at 804. "We are not entitled to recognize ... [vicarious liabil-
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attempt to "limit" the liability of employers, the Court created the "af-
firmative defense to liability in some circumstances, even when a su-
pervisor has created the actionable environment."1 20
In order to justify the new standard of employer liability, the
Court in Ellerth noted that Meritor did not limit the allowable inquiry to
agency principles, but "acknowledged other considerations might be
relevant as well."121 One consideration was Title VII's "promotion of
conciliation, rather than litigation," which the Court reasoned would
be served by premising employer liability on the employer's efforts to
create anti-harassment policies.1 22 Title VII's policy of deterrence is,
therefore, served by placing a limit on liability where the employee
does not reasonably report harassment by encouraging employees to
act. 123 Furthermore, placing a burden on the employee to report har-
assment "reflects an . . . obvious policy imported from the general
theory of damages, that a victim has a duty 'to use such means as are
reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the dam-
ages' that result from violations of the statute."1 24 In light of these
considerations, the Court created the affirmative defense that takes
into account the reasonableness of an employer's preventive and re-
medial measures and the reasonableness of an employee's response to
a harassing situation. 125
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, authored dissenting
opinions in Faragher and Ellerth.126 The dissent objected to the differ-
ent treatment given to racial harassment and sexual harassment
cases.' 27 When an employee alleges a racially hostile work environ-
ity] ... under Title VII unless we can square it with Meritors holding that an employer is
not 'automatically' liable for harassment by a supervisor who creates the requisite degree
of discrimination." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804. The Court also felt constrained by Congress,
which had "not altered Meritor's rule even though it ha[d] made significant amendments to
Title VII in the interim." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763-64.
120. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804. See supra text accompanying note 87 (reciting the affirm-
ative defense).
121. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 n.15
(1982)).
125. See id. at 807; see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65.
126. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766 (ThomasJ, dissenting); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 810
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas dissented in Faragher for the same reasons he set
forth in Ellerth. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 810 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
127. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 767 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ment, Justice Thomas noted, "the employer is liable only for negli-
gence: that is, only if the employer knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known, about the harassment and failed
to take remedial action." 128 The dissent advocated a negligence stan-
dard in sexual harassment cases, because harassment is a problem em-
ployers could not completely prevent "without taking extraordinary
measures-constant video and audio surveillance, for example-that
would revolutionize the workplace in a manner incompatible with a
free society."' 29
Despite the majority's creation of an affirmative defense for em-
ployers, the dissent reiterated that the decision was "in considerable
tension with [the Court's] holding in Meritor that employers are not
strictly liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment."' 'o The dissent ob-
jected to the creation of a new affirmative defense with "shockingly
little guidance about how employers can actually avoid vicarious liabil-
ity."'" The dissent claimed that this lack of guidance would ensure "a
continuing reign of confusion in this important area of the law."' 32
Justice Thomas concluded that, under the majority's rule, "em-
ployers will be liable notwithstanding the affirmative defense, even
though they acted reasonably, so long as the plaintiff in question fulfilled
her duty of reasonable care to avoid harm."' l "'I The dissent continued,
"[i]n practice, therefore, employer liability very well may be the
rule." 13 4 This, the dissent concluded, "is the one result . Congress
did not intend."'135
III. The Case: Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc.
Recently, in Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc.,' 36 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit was presented with an opportunity to apply
the Ellerth/Faragher standard of employer liability for sexual harass-
ment by a supervisor. 37 However, the court found that an employer
128. Id. at 768 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 770 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 773 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 771 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 773 (Thomas, J., dissenting). An analysis of the holding supports this con-
tention. For example, if an employee complains of harassment immediately, and the em-
ployer quickly responds by rectifying the situation, the employer will still be liable because
of the employee's quick complaint.
134. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 774 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136. 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).
137. See id. at 263.
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accused of sexual harassment by a supervisor who creates a hostile
work environment would not be held vicariously liable as long as the
employer promptly and effectively responded to the complaint.138
This decision was supported by two significantly conflicting opinions,
with the third judge simply concurring in the judgment, leaving the
circuit with no controlling rationale.1 39
A. Facts and Procedural History
The plaintiff, Constance Indest, alleged that she was sexually
harassed by Larry Arnaudet, the "vice-president responsible for the
company's overall sales strategy and related policies, procedures, and
systems. ''t 4° On four occasions in a period of one week, "Arnaudet
made crude sexual comments and sexual gestures to Indest while she
was alone," as well as in the presence of others.141 After one of the
encounters, Indest told Arnaudet that his actions constituted sexual
harassment. 142 In response, Arnaudet became angry, told Indest not
to threaten a vice-president, disclaimed her abilities, and told her that
she must prove herself to him by working with him at a future event in
a different city.143 Indest became agitated and cried. 144
Indest complained to the company the same week the comments
were made. 145 The company, Freeman Decorating, Inc. ("Freeman"),
responded by investigating the claim pursuant to the company's sex-
ual harassment policy, 14 6 interviewing witnesses, Indest's supervisors,
and Arnaudet. 147 As a result of the investigation, the president and
chairman of the company issued a verbal and written reprimand to
Arnaudet, and Indest was informed of the reprimand.1 48 Indest was
138. See id. at 260.
139. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 796 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wie-
ner, J., specially concurring) (explaining that because no quorum exists, neither opinion
constitutes precedent in the Fifth Circuit). On the date Judge Jones issued her opinion,
Judge Wiener reserved the right to file a separate opinion, which he filed at a later date. See
id. at 796. This Note will refer to the two opinions by their respective judges. Although the
decision does not set precedent, it is analyzed in this Note to compare the two opinions,
which the author believes demonstrates how lower courts will deal with the Ellerth/Faragher
standard of liability.
140. Indest, 164 F.3d at 260.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
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also offered a formal apology from Arnaudet, which she refused. 149
Additionally, the company asked if she would like to give suggestions
regarding possible disciplinary actions, which she also refused. 150
Three days later, the company received a letter from Indest stat-
ing her intention to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission because she feared retaliation by her
employer.' 5' The company, on two occasions, assured her that there
would be no such retaliation and notified her that Arnaudet had been
suspended, without pay, for seven days.' 52 The company also notified
Indest that she would never have to work with Arnaudet again, and
"guaranteed that her complaint would neither jeopardize her job nor
inhibit her ability to advance within the company."' 53 In addition, the
company offered to pay for any counseling she might need. 5 4 Fur-
thermore, a high-ranking committee within the company was apprised
of the situation and resolution. 155
As a result of the harassment, Indest claimed she suffered the
recurrence of an obsessive-compulsive disorder, anxiety, and sleepless-
ness, for which she received counseling. 56 Therefore, she filed an
EEOC charge of sexual discrimination and harassment. 57 After re-
ceiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, she filed suit against the
company and against Arnaudet in his individual capacity.15 8 The dis-
trict court dismissed the claims against Arnaudet and granted judg-
ment as a matter of law to the company based on the company's
prompt remedial action, which the district court felt absolved it of any
liability.' 5 9 Indest appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit. All
through the litigation and appeal, Indest continued to work for the
company.' 60 Subsequent to the incidents and resulting complaint, she
received periodic pay raises and conceded that Arnaudet had not fur-
ther harassed her. 61
149. See id. at 260-61.
150. See id. at 261.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
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B. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
1. Opinion of Judge Jones
Judge Jones initially declared that the newly established princi-
ples stemming from the Ellerth/Faragher decisions would guide the
court's decision. 16 2 She next analyzed whether the conduct alleged by
Indest rose to the level of a "sexually hostile" working environment.1 63
This was "a close question on [the] summary judgment record," but
Judge Jones stated that "it is a question that we do not need to ad-
dress, because there is another basis on which Indest's claim falls
short."' 64 Judge Jones concluded that "l[e] ven if a hostile work environ-
ment claim had been stated . . . [the company's] . . . prompt remedial
response relieves it of Title VII vicarious liability." 165
Judge Jones then examined the Ellerth/Faragher decisions and
concluded that they do not "directly speak to the circumstances
before us, a case in which the plaintiff quickly resorted to . . . [the
company's] . . . policy and grievance procedure against sexual harass-
ment, and the employer took prompt remedial action." 6 6 The judge
explained that a case involving only one isolated event that presents
an "incipient" hostile environment in which the employer took
prompt action should be distinguished from one in which the harass-
ment continues in the company's ignorance. 167 After concluding that
the Ellerth/Faragher decisions did not control the situation,Judge Jones
stated that those cases, nevertheless, "inform[ ] the principles deter-
minative of th[e] case."1 68
Judge Jones asserted that if an employee takes advantage of a
grievance procedure, the harassment would normally stop before ris-
ing to an actionable hostile working environment. 69 She reasoned
that "[t]his result effectuates the purpose of Title VII, which cannot
guarantee civility in the American workplace but, at its best, inspires
162. See id. at 263.
163. See id. at 263-64.
164. Id. at 264.
165. Id. at 267 (emphasis added). Judge Jones's assertion demonstrates the dilemma
faced by lower courts. IfJudge Jones concluded that a hostile work environment was stated,
then the employer is required to prove both elements of the affirmative defense and not
solely the employer's prompt response. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
765 (1998) (noting that the defense "compromises two necessary elements").
166. Indest, 164 F.3d at 265.
167. See id.
168. Id.
I69. See id-
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prophylactic measures to deter unwanted sexual harassment."1 70 Fur-
thermore, an employee will receive the deterrent benefit of Title VII
by promptly complaining because "an actionable hostile environment
claim will rarely if ever have matured."'71 In terms of liability, she con-
cluded that the "company's swift response to the plaintiffs complaint
should have consequences for its vicarious liability exposure precisely
because the company forestalled the creation of a hostile
environment." 172
Judge Jones based her decision on Meritor's holding that an em-
ployer is not automatically liable for harassment by a supervisor who
commits the requisite degree of sexual harassment.17 3 She noted that
Meritor was left intact by Ellerth/Faragher because of the doctrine of
stare decisis. 174 Judge Jones concluded that "[i] mposing vicarious lia-
bility on an employer for a supervisor's 'hostile environment' actions
despite its swift and appropriate remedial response to the victim's
complaint would thus undermine not only Meitor but Title VII's de-
terrent policy.' 75 She squared this conclusion with Ellerth/Faragher by
reasoning that a rule "imposing vicarious liability notwithstanding the
employer's having nipped a hostile environment in the bud" would
conflict with agency law, which was the foundation for the Ellerthi
Faragher decisions.' 76 Applying the facts to this analysis, Judge Jones
held that the employer was not liable as a matter of law, because In-
dest promptly complained, and the company properly responded,
which ultimately "stopped the harassment." 177
2. Concurring Opinion of Judge Wiener
Approximately five weeks after the issuance ofJudge Jones's opin-
ion, Judge Wiener issued an opinion, specially concurring, 78 agree-
ing that the district court should be affirmed, but for "significantly
different reasons" than those presented by judge Jones. 179 Judge Wie-
170. Id.
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 266.
173. See id. (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 (1998)).
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id. This conclusions rests on the presumption that an employer who promptly
responds to a hostile work environment has demonstrated that the supervisor was not
aided by the agency relationship when the harassment was committed. See id.
177. Id. at 267.
178. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 796 (5th Cir. 1999) (Weiner,
J., concurring).
179. Id. (Wiener, J., concurring).
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ner opened his opinion by questioning whether the straightforward
analyses of Ellerth and Faragher were controlling over the case.180 In
fact, he claimed, ELerth/Faragher control all cases in which an em-
ployee seeks to hold his or her employer vicariously liable for a super-
visor's sexual harassment. 181
Judge Wiener's disposition of the case rested on the premise that
the behavior Indest complained of did not rise to the level required
for a hostile environment case.' 8 2 He concluded that the threshold to
recovery in a hostile environment case was the existence of severe or
pervasive conduct on the part of the alleged harasser.18 3Judge Wiener
considered Judge Jones's opinion to be an improper application of
the law and, therefore, reevaluated the facts of Indest according to the
principles set forth in Ellerth/Faragher. 1 4
Judge Wiener disagreed with Judge Jones's assumption that
Arnaudet's behavior rose to an actionable level. 85 Judge Wiener ana-
lyzed the facts under the Harris standard for a hostile work environ-
ment,8 6 and concluded that the relatively isolated remarks, although
"embarrassing and contemptible, boorish and offensive," were not "so
severe and pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of Indest's
employment within the meaning of Title VII."'1 8 7 Judge Wiener con-
cluded that "[i] t is on this basis that, post-ElLerth and Faragher, I would
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Freeman."18
180. See id. (Wiener, J., concurring).
181. See id. (Wiener, J., concurring).
182. See id. at 802-03 (Wiener, J., concurring).
183. See id. at 796 (Wiener, J., concurring).
184. See id. at 797 (Wiener, J., concurring).
185. See id. at 802. (Wiener, J., concurring).
186. See discussion supra Part I.B.
187. Indest, 168 F.3d at 803 (Wiener, J., concurring). However, it is important to note
that Judge Wiener recognized that a situation could exist in which a supervisor could en-
gage "in sufficiently severe conduct.., in such a short period of time that, even though (1)
the employee reports the conduct immediately, (2) the employer takes swift and decisive
remedial action, and (3) no tangible employment actions ensues, the employer could still
be held vicariously liable under . .. Ellerth/Faragher." Id. at 804 n.52 (Wiener, J., concur-
ring). Judge Wiener expressed some hesitation about what would be the proper response
to such a situation by stating, "[w]hether or notJudge Jones or I would agree with such a
result, we remain bound by the Supreme Court's judgment in the matter." Id. (Weiner, J.,
concurring). With regard to such a situation, the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court intended to avoid automatic liability for employers and to
give credit to employers who take steps to prevent and correct harassment, but instead
created a defense that would not protect employers in cases of single, severe conduct. See
Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 173 F.3d 595, 597 (8th Cir. 1999).
188. Indest, 168 F.3d at 803 (Wiener, J., concurring).
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Judge Wiener also disputed Judge Jones's conclusion that the
prompt reporting and equally prompt response to the harassment re-
moved the case from the Ellerth/Faragher holdings.18 9 In sum, Judge
Wiener stated:
Neither the structure nor the plain language and holding of either
Ellerth or Faragher supports Judge Jones's conclusion that cases such
as this one, in which an employee promptly reports, and an em-
ployer rapidly responds to, harassing behavior by a supervisor, fall
into some unarticulated lacuna on the Ellerth/Faragher
framework. ' 90
In Judge Wiener's opinion, the fact that Indest immediately com-
plained made the affirmative defense unavailable to the company be-
cause her prompt complaint was reasonable, thereby eliminating the
possibility of Freeman proving the second element of the affirmative
defense. 191
In conclusion, Judge Wiener noted that the panel should have
ended its inquiry with a conclusion that the behavior complained of
did not rise to a level that implicates Title VII. 192 However, in an ap-
parent attempt to provide guidance for lower courts, Judge Wiener
continued by explaining the process of deciding sexual harassment
claims. The analysis began with a determination of whether a tangible
employment action occurred. 93 Because there was no tangible em-
ployment action at issue, Judge Wiener instructed that it was necessary
to make a determination whether the conduct rose to the requisite
hostile work environment, i.e., whether the conduct was "severe or
pervasive."'194 Only if the conduct is sufficiently "severe or pervasive"
does the employer need to escape liability by proving both elements
of the affirmative defense. 95
IV. Analysis and Criticism
A. Indest Does Not Comply with Ellerth/Faragher
The facts of Indest indicate the alleged harassment was relatively
isolated. The harassment took place over a period of one week and
189. See id. at 798 (Wiener, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 801 (Wiener, J., concurring).
191. See id. at 802 (Wiener, J., concurring). Judge Wiener noted that Indest's prompt
reporting "alone interdicts any attempt by Freeman to assert the one surviving affirmative
defense and exposes the invalidity of excusing Freeman solely on the basis of its grievance
system and prompt response, as proposed by judge Jones." Id. (Wiener, J., concurring).
192. See id. at 806 (Wiener, J., concurring).
193. See id. at 805-06 (Wiener, J., concurring).
194. See id. (Wiener, J., concurring).
195. See id. (Wiener, J., concurring).
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was reported to management soon after it occurred.196 Judge Jones
asserted that it was the brevity of the incident, and the company's
prompt response, that removed it from the principles laid down in
Ellerth/Faragher.197 However, the Ellerth/Faragher decisions do not sup-
port the conclusions that brief incidents which were promptly re-
sponded to protect an employer from liability or preclude an
employer from presenting the affirmative defense. 198 This is precisely
the situation thatJustice Thomas recognized in his dissenting opinion
in Ellerth when he stated, "employers will be liable ... even though they
acted reasonably, so long as the plaintiff in question fulfilled her duty of
reasonable care."'199 Likewise, in guidelines issued as a response to El-
lerth/Faragher, the EEOC also opposed Judge Jones's conclusion by
stating that "[i]f both parties exercise reasonable care, the defense will
fail." 20°
Literally applying Judge Jones's analysis, a court should not hold
an employer liable if the employer took prompt action to correct a
harassing situation, notwithstanding the reasonable response of the
employee. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that "a prompt response by an authorized agent to halt re-
ported harassment is sufficient to relieve the employer of liability
under Title VII in cases where the harassment has not culminated in
the taking by a supervisor of a tangible employment action against the
victim."20 1 Judge Jones was able to circumvent Ellerth and Faragher and
196. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1999).
197. See id. at 265.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 90, 187.
199. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 773 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
200. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer
Liability for Unlawful Harassment 6y Supervisors, No. 915.002, Part V(B), at http://www.eeoc.
gov/docs/harassment.html (June 18, 1999). This is in stark contrast to the EEOC's prior
position that in such a situation, an employer would be liable if "it ha[d] actual knowledge
of the harassment or if, considering all the facts of the case, the victim in question had no
reasonably available avenue for making his or her complaint known to appropriate man-
agement officials." Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71 (1986).
201. Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999) (Barkett, J.,
specially concurring). Additionally, two unpublished circuit court opinions support the
conclusion that an employer's prompt response should preclude liability. See Barna v. City
of Cleveland, Nos. 96-3971, 96-4178, 974130, 1998 WL 939884, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 22,
1998) (unpublished opinion) (noting that "[flairness requires only that an employer be
given an opportunity to respond to an employee's complaint before being pulled into
court"); Watkins v. Prof I Sec. Bureau, No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5 n.16 (4th Cir.
Nov. 15, 1999) (unpublished opinion) ("[W]e cannot conceive that an employer that satis-
fies the first element of the affirmative defense... would be held liable for the harassment
on the basis of an inability to satisfy the literal terms of the second element.").
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avoid imposing liability by deciding that the Supreme Court's holding
does not apply to situations where the employee quickly responded by
reporting the harassment. 202 However, Ellerth/Faragher do not support
this assertion; neither decision addressed such a situation. 203 Further-
more, there is nothing in Ellerth/Faragher to indicate that the em-
ployer's prompt response alone is enough to preclude liability.
Judge Jones's opinion demonstrates the problem that exists in
light of EllerthiFaragher. Courts are reluctant to impose vicarious liabil-
ity on an employer who acts with reasonable care before, during, and
after an allegedly harassing situation occurs, regardless of the stan-
dard imposed by the United States Supreme Court. Judge Jones's
opinion exemplifies how lower courts might resolve claims of sexual
harassment by a supervisor where both of the parties act reasonably
with respect to a harassing situation. However, this analysis does not
conform to the mandate of the EllerthiFaragher decisions.
Literally applying the Ellerth/Faragher standard to the facts of In-
dest would result in employer liability for the supervisor's conduct. In
order for harassment to be actionable, it must result in a tangible em-
ployment action or create a hostile work environment.20 4 Indest suf-
fered no tangible employment action, but rather she alleged a hostile
working environment based on verbal harassment by Arnaudet20 5 As-
suming the court found the harassment to be actionable, the analysis
would then move to the affirmative defense. Due to the company's
immediate response, it is clear that it had in place an effective policy
for reporting and correcting harassing situations. It is equally clear
that Indest's prompt reporting of the harassment was a reasonable
utilization of the policy. Therefore, despite the employer's prompt re-
sponse, Indest acted reasonably by immediately reporting the offen-
sive conduct, thereby eliminating the employer's affirmative defense
under Ellerth/Faragher.2°6
B. Ellerth/Faragher Creates a No-Win Situation for Employers
The Supreme Court in Ellerth stated that "[w] ere employer liabil-
ity to depend in part on an employer's effort to create [grievance]
202. See Indest, 164 F.3d at 265.
203. See Louis P. DiLorenzo, Emjployer Liability for Suiervisor Harassment After Ellerth and
Faragher (pt. V), 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 3 (1999) (discussing questions that the
Supreme Court left open in Ellerth/Faragher ).
204. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998).
205. See Indest, 164 F.3d at 260.
206. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 773 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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procedures, it would effect Congress' intention to promote concilia-
tion rather than litigation in the Title VII context."29 7 Ironically, how-
ever, a strict application of the affirmative defense established in
Ellerth/Faragher would have the opposite result. An employee who acts
reasonably in reporting harassing conduct, thereby destroying the em-
ployer's ability to prove the second element of the affirmative defense,
will be encouraged to litigate.
In regard to the second element of the affirmative defense, the
Court reasoned, "[t]o the extent [that] limiting employer liability
could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it be-
comes severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title VII's deterrent pur-
pose." 20 8 However, while this element encourages employees to report
harassing conduct after it has already occurred, it does not appear to
deter harassing conduct before it occurs. In fact, it may actually deter
employers from creating effective grievance policies, because the
more effective a company policy is in encouraging an employee to
report harassment, the less likely an employer will be able to prove the
second element of the affirmative defense. In essence, the Supreme
Court is asking employers to create policies that will leave them vicari-
ously liable if harassment does occur.
An analysis of the affirmative defense supports the foregoing con-
clusions. In order to escape vicarious liability, an employer must prove
both of the following elements: "(a) that the employer exercised rea-
sonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm othenise.''2°9 The crux of the problem
involves the second element, and the fact that the Supreme Court re-
quires the employer to prove the existence of both elements. When an
employee promptly reports a harassing situation, the first element of
the defense becomes irrelevant, because the employer will be unable
to establish the second element. Therefore, in nearly all situations
where a harassed employee reports the conduct, or "avoids harm oth-
erwise," the employer will be automatically liable-a result the Su-
preme Court claimed it was seeking to avoid.210
207. Id. at 764 (citing EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984)).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
210. See id. at 763.
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V. A Proposed Alternative Defense
This Note proposes an alternative solution to the Ellerth/Faragher
defense that would solve the problems discussed above and alleviate
the tension between ELerth/Faragher and Judge Jones's opinion in In-
dest. Under this alternative defense, an employer could escape liability
for a supervisor's creation of a hostile work environment by proving
both of the following elements: (1) the employer exercised reasona-
ble care by creating and maintaining preventative and remedial pro-
grams relating to sexual harassment; and (2) the employer exercised
reasonable care in responding to notice that harassment has oc-
curred. Because this approach focuses primarily on the behavior of
the employer, it does not permit the situation created by the Ellerth/
Faragher defense, where the actions of an employee alone effectively
eliminate the possibility of the employer proving the elements of the
affirmative defense. This proposed alternative defense therefore fo-
cuses on the actions of the employer-the party most effectively
equipped to deal with harassment-thereby encouraging the em-
ployer to deal with harassment before, while, and after it occurs.
This proposed defense would urge both the employer and the
employee to act reasonably, and would reward both for their respec-
tive conduct. Unlike the Ellerth/Faragher defense, the second element
of the proposed defense focuses on the employer's response to notice
of harassment. Though the focus remains on the employer, a factor in
the reasonableness of the employer's response is necessarily the rea-
sonableness of the employee's behavior. When an employee unrea-
sonably fails to notify an employer of harassment, the reasonableness
of the employer's response is bolstered because the employer is not
expected to respond to conduct of which it is uninformed. On the
other hand, an employer who receives a complaint, or is otherwise
aware that harassment is occurring, and does not reasonably respond
to the situation will not be able to prove the second element of the
proposed defense. Therefore, the party acting unreasonably will be
responsible for the harm: the employer if it does not act reasonably in
creating and implementing a sexual harassment policy or responding
to notice of sexual harassment; or the employee if he or she is unrea-
sonable in allowing harassing conduct to continue in the face of rea-
sonable measures provided by the employer.
An analysis of this proposed defense also demonstrates how it
would both serve the deterrence goals of Title VII and promote con-
ciliation rather than litigation. The first element, proof of reasonable
programs dealing with sexual harassment, encourages the employer to
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create and maintain sexual harassment programs, which likely will
have a deterrent effect. Furthermore, the employer's liability is par-
tially determined by the effectiveness of these programs under the sec-
ond element, which will promote conciliation by encouraging
employers to rectify harassment when it does occur. Because the effec-
tiveness of the program is relevant to this analysis, the employer is
encouraged not only to create sexual harassment programs, but also
to systematically educate employees regarding the program's exis-
tence and to encourage employees to report harassment through the
program's procedures.
Lastly, this alternative approach would eliminate the problem ex-
posed by judge Jones's opinion. The employer in Indest would be able
to prove the elements of the proposed defense by focusing on the
existence of a harassment program and the fact that the harassing sit-
uation was immediately eradicated. Courts would not be faced with
situations that require liability to be imposed on an employer who has
taken conscientious steps to prevent and eradicate harassment. In-
stead, courts would be able to reward such behavior by allowing the
employer to be absolved of any liability. Furthermore, it would clarify
the situation in which all parties act reasonably, a situation left muddy
by Ellerth/Faragher, as evidenced by Indest.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this Note urges Congress or the Supreme Court to
revisit employer liability for sexual harassment. In doing so, the em-
phasis should be placed on the employer-that is, on the party being
faced with the prospect of liability. The Ellerth/Faragher affirmative de-
fense creates untenable results in situations where all parties have ac-
ted reasonably, or in the event of a single, severe act of harassment.
Therefore, an alternative is needed that allows the employer to be ab-
solved of liability based on the employer's efforts to prevent and cor-
rect harassment. Not only is such an approach arguably workable
under all circumstances, it also serves to place liability where it be-
longs-on the unreasonable party.
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